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LAOS AND AMERICA-A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW 
Reprinted from The South Atlantic Quarterly 
Yol, LXIII, f40. 2, Spring, 1964 
Laos and America- 
A Retrospective View 
Barbara and Joel Halpern 
i 
The farmers in a certain section of the U.S. seemed implicitly to 
divide human beings into three categories: scenery, machinery, and 
people. In the first category they grouped Indians on the nearby 
reservation, who could be seen on a Sunday drive and from whom 
souvenirs could be bought. In the second category were migrant 
farm laborers who had to be maintained-fed, housed, and super- 
vised. In the people category they placed neighbors, relatives, and 
friends with whom they socidized and went to church, and with 
whose children theirs went to school. 
The peoples of Laos have been viewed by the Western world 
mostly as enchanting scenery and, more recently, as rather poor 
machinery. The French were early smitten with the human scenery, 
and in a travel account published in 1868 Henri Mouhot depicted 
the Lao as q ~ ~ e t ,  submissive, patient, temperate, trusting, credulous, 
superstitious, faithful, simple, and naYve. Needless to say, he de- 
clared the women beautiful. Auguste Pavie, the man most respon- 
sible for French colonization of Laos, found the capital of the King- 
dom of Luang Frabang s delightful place in which to make his 
borne for several years. Until the end of the French coIonial period 
Laos continued to be regarded as a kind of Shangri-la remote from 
the problems of the world, In. recent years journalists covering 
politicaI crises have succumbed perhaps less to the charm than to 
the stereotype and have described the Lao as irresponsible and 
carefree. Human beings as ill-fuhctioning machinery began to enter 
the picture during the 1960-1961 civil war. This was particularIy 
true when the poor showing of the Royal Lao Army was attributed 
to their Buddhist faith or inclination to be carefree. 
MRS. HALPERN, a lecturer, and MR. HALPERN, u~mciate profemor of anthropology 
at Brandeis University, were field represenintives for the foreign oid program in 
northern Lnos in 1957. T h e  latter revisited Laos in I959 08 consuitant to the 
RAND Corporation. 
176 The South Arlantk QumterIy 
When Americans have thought about Lms it has been in terms 
of scenery or possibly machinery but not in terns of people, a 
classification which seems to require a faiily long period of recipm- 
cal contact. The reifying of the social scientist is similar to the 
machine category, while photographs emphasize tbe scenery aspect. 
To know a particular person as an individual inhibits the scenery 
concept and makes more dficuIt the use of mechanical categories 
of classiiication. Around Luang Prabmg, Meo tribesmen, with their 
red pompom-trimmed caps, heavy silver neck-rings, short indigo 
jackets, and bare torsos above flaring britches are superb subjects 
for photography, but after they began to visit our home and we 
learned to know them as individuals concerned with the education 
of their children a d  the marketing of their crops, they became 
individuals rather than curiosities. Witnessing a Lao administrator's 
grief at the death of his k s t  child made it  impossible to view him 
simply as a member of the rising elite who combined the desire to 
modernize his country with a continuing belief in the power of 
animistic spirits. 
Scenery, both physical and hum=, abounds in Laos. Most 
captivating is that of the royal capital, which appears to incarnate 
much of traditional Lao society that has largely vanished in Vien- 
tiane and elsewhere. Approaching Luaag Prabang from afar, by 
plane, road, w river, the most striking sight is the flashing gold 
spire of the Phou Si, a Buddhist shrine on top of the conical peak 
rising from the center of the peniasda that forms tbe town. One 
glimpses the RoyaI PaIace through a screen of frangipani and flame- 
tree blossoms. The airborne visitor gains a full view of the royal 
city nestled on a finger of land at the confluence of the broad 
Mekong and the clearer waters of the Nam Khan, the embank- 
ments fringes with feathery bamboo groves and the valley rimmed 
by undulating blue-green mountah. Scarcely minutes away by 
air are scattered tribal villages on the mountain tops and slopes, 
amid scars of burned-over forest patches, and following the rivers, 
more Lao villages and rice fields tucked into pocket valleys. This 
is Laos in miniature, the town strings out along the river, with its 
sovereign, temples, and trade, the mountains and valleys beyond 
sheltering the peasants and tribesmen who form the majority of 
her people. 
Luang Psabang can overwhelm the senses, There are the peri- 
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odic boom and tinkle of temple drums; the scent of joss sticks, jas- 
mine, and open sewage; the sight of pagodas, each with i ts own 
community of monks. Some of the graceful temples are shabby, and 
their frescoes of b r d  Buddha's incarnations are not among Asia's 
finest. StiI1, the eye is dazzled by sweeping roofs surmounted by i Nagas, by the red and gold faqades set with chips of blue glass mosaic, by the saffron robes of the bonzes spread to dry on bloom- 
/ ing rose bushes in the temple courtyard, guarded by grimacing plaster lions and lichen-covered stone pillars. 
At the time of f i t h e  Lao New Year the pageantry is magnificent, 
the more so for being on so small a scale. There are parades of the 
half-dozen royal elephants, processions of monks led by the abbots 
borne on gilded paIaquins, and the appearance of the king, in his 
cream-colored silk sampot, under the white parasol, symboI of the 
kingdom, followed by high officials in jewel-hued garments and 
accompanied by retainers waving ceremonial fans and by sword- 
bearers and drum-beaters in scarlet uniforms. All this harks to a 
fast-disappearing past. The Western-style royal band in its natty, 
oversize uniforms, with kepi military hats slipping low over Lao 
ears, bespeaks an ill-fitting present. 
Remains of serrated potsherds and implements in the river bank 
near the Palace testify to thousands of years of history. The royal 
family's finely incised gold betel services recall a regal world of 
half a millennium ago. Today's kerosene tins for hauling water 
from the river and dugout canoes powered by outboard motors are 
not new as change, but they are new as universals. Rice cultivation, 
Buddhism, and the divine right of kings as cuItural elements and 
complexes spread over large portions of the globe, but they never 
attained the universality of the internd combusion engine or paper 
currency. 
A new Laotian synthesis is evolving on the old one of Indian, 
Chinese, and aboriginal influences, It is not a question of mechani- 
cd intermksing of parliamentary forms, communist ideology, con- 
stitutional monarchy, Buddhism, animism, irrigated rice culture, 
barter trade, handicrafts, and international politics, but of reshaping, 
redefining and shifting emphases. In  a s t i l l  fluid social and political 
situation, predictions for the future are r i sky ,  but a number of - . 
assumptions seem fairly safe. The United States' effort in Laos has 
been a failure. The question remains whether the failure is absoIute 
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or partial. Unlike in many other countries such as Nationalist China, 
to cite the classic case, there has never been any real effort to create 
a positive public image either of Laos or the American program 
there. The sole efforts in this direction have been press releases of 
the State Department and the foreip aid program, the chief func- 
tion of which appears to have been their use as straw men for jour- 
nalists and Congressional critics of the aid program. T h e  stories 
of corruption of the elite and basic failure of rural development 
programs, as well as the inability and lack of aggressiveness of the 
Roy a1 A m y ,  are familiar. But there are a number of matters relating 
to our failure in Laos as well as to possible lessons to 'be learned 
from this experience which have scarcely been mentioned in print. 
The American role in Laos has been a very brief one, having 
begun after the Geneva Conference in 1954. American cultural 
impact on Laos has been superficial in the cultural sense but very 
great in the economic sense. In  all phases of life, the American 
presence in the form of diplomatic functions, economic and military 
aid programs, and information activities has collided head-on with 
stronsty entrenched French influence in these fields, in the cultural 
characteristics of the Lao di te  themselves, aJl of whom received 
a French-sponsored education, and in the continuing physical pres- 
ence of French advisors in almost a11 important government minis- 
tries, particularly during the late 1950's. 
Up to 1959, official American foreign policy entertained some 
hope of building up Laos as an anti-Communist buffer under the 
protective umbrella of SEATO, although no one ever seriously 
considered it a defense bastion. But by the time' of the Geneva 
Peace Conference in May, 1961, the United States, faced with a 
de fact0 Pathet Lao victory in much of the country, was advocating 
a neutraI Laos. 
Certain features have consistently characterized American 
policy in Laos, patticularly as it pertained to economic assistance. 
Despite much talk about technicd aid and a large number of 
projects in this field, the program had been primarily d i t a r y  untiI 
the failure of the Royal Lao troops in the field. Secondary emphasis 
was placed on the police and third on transportation projects. By 
comparison, the s u m s  spent on education, health, agriculture, and 
community development were small. Even when significant mraI 
aid projects have been undertaken, these have been directed by the 
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army. ' I l e  main part of these efforts has consistently reflected the 
machinery aspects of human relations, and the spectacular failure 
of this program is too well known to need documentation here. 
More significant in retrospect is to understand why they were under- 
taken in the h t  place. BasicalIy, they seem to represent a me&& 
cal approach to complex s w i d  phenomena or, in times of crises, to 
I 
rely on some of the tactics that were successful in winning World 
War 11. Certainly the military aid program to Laos bears re- 
semblance to its general ideological if not lineal ancestor, the 
lend-lease program of World War  TI. AIso important: were the 
assumed virtues of a consumer economy. However, when these 
concepts are removed from our own history and cuIture and applied 
not to a war in Europe, or to a hishly industrialized economy which 
also places great vdne on work and achievement, but transferred 
to a predominaatIy subsistence and barter trade economy with 
Buddhist and snimist religious systems, quite different results are 
achieved. 
The use of Mercedes Bern automobiles by almost all high- 
ranking oficials can be cited as an example of the corruption of 
the elite. This takes on special meaning for Laos if the Mercedes is 
contrasted with an d e ~ h a n t ,  the former having become the pre- 
rogative of the contem^porary elite and the latter being the nadi- 
tiond one. A royal prince or high official riding on an elephant 
does net arouse envy or scorn. The elephant is the beloved symbol 
of the kingdom, inte~ated ritually into the life of the country. A 
parade of painted and garlanded elephants is a source of pleasure 
to dl,  while a Mercedes Benz can be a pleasure only to an individual 
and his family. EIephants move with digity and, say the Lao, with 
grace. To tell a Lao young woman she walks Iike an elephant is a 
compliment, but "classy chassis" or its equivalent has no meaning 
in Lao culture. Riding slowly by atop an elephant, the individual 
has a chance to see and to be seen by the populace; dfivinp past 
in a car he kicks up dust in people's faces. Elephants are secured 
through the hunt, and protection of the spirits is sought. Metcedes 
have been obtained through currency manipnIations, or at best 
account juggling, and are the indirect largess of a foreign power. 
But what member of the present-day elite would prefer an clep&ant 
to an automobile? Cars were first introduced into Laos by the 
French and were the privilege of the highest colonial officials and 
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of the king. Therefore, although far from sacred, Imury automo- 
biles have become a new status symbol, one that connotes not power 
but wealth and, more importantly, unearned and unsanctified 
wealth. 
American policy in Laos may be characterized as simultaneously 
anticolonialist and anti-Communist in ideology, mechanical in plan- 
ning, expedient in implementation and at the same time colonialist 
in method. Our awn revolutionary tradition undoubtedly influenced 
the American government to take an idealized view of the Laotian 
state just emerging from coIonia3isrn. How else to explain America's 
initial distrust of and disgust with the French? Had the American 
diplomats and economic assistance persome1 been willing to humble 
themselves, ask French advice, and consider continuing certain 
French policies, it is possible that the pride of our Gallic friends 
might not have been so greatly wounded and that, if not stively 
helping lhe American effort, they at least would not have tried to 
undermine it. But evidently the State Department representatives 
saw only a discredited colonial power. While there were undoubtedly 
some Lao elite who had grudges against the French, many of them, 
who considered themselves "chiidren of the French peace (unlike 
the Vietnamese, who, if one follows out the analogy, considered 
themseIves bastards of French coIonialisrn) ," might have willingly 
co-operated with such a policy. Instead, unlike the more realistic 
North Vietnamese who molded the Pathet Lao ta their own ends, 
and the French who were now bereft of their power and so, also, 
of many of their illusions, the Americans engendered French hos- 
tility and then permitted many of the astute Lao elite to play them 
of£ against the French and also the Pathet Lao as an implied threat. 
Unfortunately too many of the elite were clever only hm the 
point of view of amassing their own fortunes and not for building 
up their government. T h e  American government permitted itself 
to be blackmaiIed by a series of Lao governments which were com- 
pletely dependent on our aid program. 
The Americans desired above all a viable Lao army, so the Lao 
politicians were able to dangle the loyalty of ibis army and its con- 
cept of anti-Communism over the heads of the Americans whenever 
the latter suggested currency reforms or other innovations. It might: 
be thought that in a heoretical sense two anti-types of ideologies 
might coalesce into a single positive program, but as it worked 
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out they tended to nullify each other. When the anticolonialist 
ideology suggested reform, more often than not the anti-Corn- 
munist ideology triumphed, the implication ironically being that 
ref oms  might lead to instability, possibIy anarchy, and conceivably 
a Communist alternative, while stability-that is, support of the 
status gu-implied , superficial anti-Communism, e.g., good tra- 
ditional Buddhists cannot become Communists. 
SimuItaneousIy, a mechanically pIanned aid program of salaries 
in kip with dollar-hanced imports to absorb the kip generated by 
salary payments resulted in undermining not only Buddhism but 
what was left of the traditional elite power structure as well. It is 
painfully evident that the institution of an expanding military and 
economic aid program propssivel y decreased whatever felt inde- 
pendence of action the elite may have had. In fact they became 
vassals of the Americans, 'but in public theory at least the Ameri- 
cans believed in anticolonialism, and hence the myth of Lao inde- 
pendence. Certain segments of the Lao elite, with a potential 
anarchy transmutable to Communism conceivably at band, were 
able effectively to manipulate the AmericansVears. Both parties 
became involved in progressive self and mutuaI deception, albeit 
of diEerent kinds. The Americans, while often covertly dissatisfied 
with the composition of various Lao governments, felt that there was 
little tbey could do within the ideological limits they had set them- 
selves. 
Part of the mechanical planning rested on this anticolonialist 
myth of Lao independence; thus the whole of the aid mission was 
there at the request, and the programs being undertaken on the 
initiative, of the Lao government. Not too much attention was 
paid, however, to the conficting anticoIonialist and anti-Communist 
ideologies in program implementation. These were the underlying 
impIicit assumptions which were not often questioned, least of all 
by the people on the scene, especially those in the military and aid 
program. Transferring implicit concepts from American domestic 
life and from the success of the Marshall Plan in Europe strained 
most energies in Washington and Laos. Things were brought ia a 
pipeline to Laos in great numbers: army uniforms, rifles, smaIl 
arms, trucks, jeeps, buEldozers, a power plant, tugs, galvanized 
roofing, and some medicines, among many other items. To keep 
things moving in a pipeline takes much effort. Papers must be 
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filled out and transmitted, and taxpayers' dollars must be justifid 
to a reluctant Congress, which in past years has always been more 
amenable to military aid w a short basis than economic and tech- 
nical aid over a longer period. In times of stress the capacity of the 
pipeline was increased: in 1959 and 1960 the American public was 
told that the crises in Laos were being met by stepping up arms 
shipments. These shipments had been sufficient in the past, during 
the Indochina War, to supply not only the French forces but, 
though-capture, the Vietminh as well, sq that in a number of actions 
in Laos both sides were reported to be using American equipment. 
This is not to say that equipment and salaries are not important to 
a .  army in waging war, but that more vital is a will ta fight. To 
conceal this failure in approach it has been necessary to invent 
another myth about passive, Buddhist Lao who are not interest& 
in fighting. This is a proposition that bears n6 relationship to the 
turbulent history of the area. At the same time, concepts of people 
as scenery have made selfaeception easier. 
This kind of planning has been evident in technical assistance 
programs as well, where funds must be committed for the present 
year and programmed for the next. The culmination of this process 
is the r i tua l  exchange of smiIes and handshakes for goods, ephem- 
erally memoridized in news photographs and propaganda posters. 
Should the Communists consoLidate their victories and American 
infIuence be eliminated from Laos, there will have been endless 
official smiles .to cover the grave of Iost American hopes. The most 
"materialistic" peopIe on earth will have traded a small portion of 
our treasures for an evanescent anti-Communist stdux quo main- 
tained through a few brief years. When Americans feel threatened 
they emphasize action and sped.  Crash programs were set up, with 
hurried plans and symbolic results. In Laos the peasant was redis- 
covered, and m a 1  development, "Civic Action," on a crash basis 
was rewarded by houses built but not h d  in, movies shown but 
not understood, propaganda publications distributed to cover cracks 
on bamboo walls, prize chickens eaten but not bred, roads built 
but not maintained. Again the "materialists" were temporarily 
satisfied with fleeting symbolic acts. 
This type of planning and action requires no knowledge beyond 
an implicit faith in one's own culture and its stereotyped view of 
another. For the believer in the ever constant jeep and airplane and 
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in the imperative to adopt variabIe nature to their needs, surveys 
of reads and airfield sites are necessary. Passive Buddhism and 
colorful, traditional, hungry, sick, illiterate rural people can be 
assumed to be forever constant if an idealistic view of the world is 
to be perpetuated. But jeeps do change socia1 structures, education 
experts do affect religious vaIue systems, and exchange mtes do 
affect concepts of the future. In some cases even hindsight may be 
k covered up with another myth to replace the one destroyed: Ratter 
the Communists by attributing to their influence all unexpected 
changes. 
It is possible to be colonialist in methodology and anticolonialist 
in ideology. Recognition of the concept of a free and independent 
Laos with a vision of its economic progress and institutional sta- 
bility does not define how one shall live and work to bring this 
about. If speed, action, and recruitment are important, then c o b  
nialist methodology becomes imperative. If salary and living condi- 
tions are aqsumed to be major motivations, the recruitment to Little 
America becomes axiomatic. Little America provided housing 
segregated from that of the host country, frozen foods in a com- 
missary, and exclusive community facilities. Action required those 
who, unlike almost all Lao of the mid-fifties, were familiar with the 
Fnplish language and American techniques. Just as the French used 
Vietnamese in Laos, so the Americans have had Chinese from Hong 
Kong as servants and en,@neers, FiIipinos as architects and account- 
ants, Thai from Bangkok as interpreters and warehousemen. 
Have we learned in this small and in many ways marfinal 
country anything which might be applicable elsewhere? Given the 
geographic relation of Laos to neighboring China and North Viet- 
nam, was it possible for Laos to remain independent even with 
an enIightened American prosam if the steadfast intention of China 
md Vietnam was to subvert her? While defmitive answers to these 
questions are not possible, we can envisage courses of action alterna- 
tive to those that have been pursued, Possibly these might be helpful 
in planning programs in those countries which, in terms of ethnic 
diversity, economic underdevelopment, reliance on traditional 
power structures and on external assistance, share many features 
that have characterized Laos. A primary need is to conceptualize 
the future clearly. What type of government and social system do 
the local elite foresee a year, five years, or a decade or more hence? 
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To what extent do these aspirations accord with American aims 
and objectives? Is it possible to harmonize the two? A major prob- 
lem obstructing the solution of issues of this nature was that faced 
by the American movernment in Laos, namely a traditional and P basically conservative elite who opposed an active Communist or- 
ganization. Should the United States support reform groups, as was 
covertly attempted in the case of a young eIite reform group in 
Laos? It is possible that one of the factors contributing to failure 
was the lack of consistent and co-ordinated programs, particuIarly . 
with regard to rural areas and minority problems. There was at 
Ieast a fair chance that if long-range planning in these fields had 
begun in 1955 and 1956 some basis for resisting Pathet Lao infil- 
tration in the countryside might have been established. Much of 
the talk in the United States has revolved around the amount of 
fore@ aid, and there is ample indication that in the Laos case, 
especiauy in the rniIitary fieId, too much money was spent too 
heedlessly. 
Part of the difficulty in an entrenched elite and the lack of 
alternatives is related to the matter of trained personnel. Sporadic 
attempts were made to train a few Lao in various fields, in the 
United States and also to send others to Thailand and  the Philip- 
pines for special study. The major fault with these programs was 
that too few were chosen and that they were sent for too short a time. 
Further, most of them were the sons or relatives of the elite. Had 
1,000 students selected from the elite and at least an equal number 
from villages and tribal areas been sent for one, two, three, and 
four year courses of study, by 1960 there could have been a few 
hundred college graduates in engineering, education, agriculture, 
and medicine. The cost would have been at most a few miIlion 
dollars a year, a fraction of the cost of military supplies (many of 
which decayed or rusted and were never used). Flexibility and 
knowledge are cIosely linked ta long-ranp planning. One of the I 
best ways of embarking on a long-range development program is I 
to profit from the knowledge and institutions created by the former + 
colonial power. (There is a danger in associating policy too closeIy 
with that of a former colonial power, but there is also the opposite 
hazard which occurred, at least initially, in Laos.) 
Although various topographic surveys were undertaken in Laos, 
American officials consistently Iacked any basic howledge of mral 
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economies, tribal organizations, or even urban development. It is 
t rue  that in theory it might be nice to depend on the local govern- 
ment for this information, but with Laos's lack of trained personnel 
much of this information was often unavailable to local authorities. 
B d g ,  tax, transportation, and geological consultants were em- 
ployed by American agencies, but aside from a few supeficial 
surveys at no time were any anthrop~ogists, linguists, sociologists, 
human geographers, agricultural economists, or political scientists 
employmi, much less consulted. American ofliciaIs during their 
tenure in Laos in the 1950's were never precisely aware of the 
cultures of the tribal peoples, the Ianguages they spoke, the roIe 
of the Buddhist pagoda in Lao village life or, for that matter, the 
traditional value system of the Lao. Nor were the responsible 
American officials during this critical period particularly interested 
in seeking any of this kind of information. 
Knowledge alone will not insure success, no more than an 
understanding of Mao Tse Tung's tactics of guerrilla warfare based 
in ruraI areas prevented a repetition of the same developments in 
Vietnam and Laos. Intelligently trained diplomatic personnel with 
knowIedge of the local lanpage (Lao, not French) and a back- 
mround in tl1e history, customs, and traditions of the a, 5 rea are essen- ha1 and will also help not onIy in securing information but in 
insuring its best utilization. This situation is changing, but even 
good, dedicated personnel are no substitute for leadership and a 
clearly conceived future program of action. 
With regard to positive external policies, regional federations 
of local nations can also be very important, as can concerted pro- 
grams of economic and technical assistance through the United 
Nations. As far as Laos is concerned, one of the most hopeful 
developments, although perhaps too late, has been the Mekong 
Development Plan, undertaken under the auspices of the United 
Nations, in which Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam 
share in a common program of d&elopment based on the Mekon: 
basin. Furthering bonds with Thailand was a positive and significant 
policy of the American government in Laos, but, unfortunately, 
this policy never had time to bear fruit. 
Without doubt many of these points are not practical in the 
sense that they actually could have been accomplished in Lao? or 
can be easily accomplished in other areas. But faiIure is also im- 
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practical, in an even broader sense. It does not require great clair- 
voyance to predict that what happened in Laos will also occur, 
with local variations, in other countries unless the future is clearly 
conceived by American policy-makers and attempts are made to 
implement these conceptions either with existing governments or 
the emerging governments. Positive and dynamic ideologies must 
be evolved from living syntheses of local traditions and democratic 
Western politicd inheritances. Communist programs for develop- 
ment as evolved in North Vietnam and eIsewhere are not inevitable 
since they depend on coercion, but: an imaginatively conceived 
future is an indispensable prerequisite for effective counterpolicy. 
The Americans and their Lao associates succeeded in destroying 
the traditional bases for effective rule without any positive replace- 
ment. As long as such policies are continued the triumph of Com- 
munist-sponsored movements is indeed inevitable. 
It is considered unfashionable to mourn the passing of the noble 
savage or the romantic past, a past which was pleasanter than the 
future in prospect. In Laos one can say that the greatest causes for 
change have been external. WMe military intrusions are not new 
in Lao history, French colonialism, followed by American presence 
in the economic and political senses, are charac terjstic developments 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as are, obviousIy, the 
motivating Communist philosophies of Laas' two northern neigh- 
bors. Neither the Lao not the tribal peoples were much bothered by 
problems of land reform or famine, and although there have been 
social frictions these have been basically resolvable since Laos is 
an underpopulated country; so pressures for rapid social change 
cannot be considered internal. But even the external pressures are 
symptoms rather than basic causes: it is really the social imperatives 
arising from the worldwide diffusion of an industrial civilization 
that are causing vast changes in Laotian cultural patterns. Regard- 
less of the outcome of the present politico-military struggIe, many 
of the unique features of Lao civilization wilI disappear because 
shey are no longer functional. We have museums for adfacts but 
none for traditions and value systems. Change is not new, but the 
progressive disappearance of unique ways of life is. WhiIe world- 
wide cultural uniformity does net appear imminent, the progres- 
sive elimination of small civiliza~ons even though temporarily 
conceived of as modem independent national entities appears a 
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growing trend. Lao music, crafts, religiaus holidays, life crises rites, 
folk tales, and even behavior patterns and value systems will aU be 
partially or completeIy obliterated in the not too distant future, 
and there is surely some cause for regret, aside from the purely 
sentimental. 
It is conceivable that greater understanding of cultusat. processes 
in the future may enable us to plan how minor as well as major 
civihzations may be modified and certain desirable elements p r e  
served by means of social engineering, hopefully democratiE in 
nature. We are not inevitable absoIute slaves of the culture process, 
in Laos or elsewherethe Pathet Lao and their backers have done 
well in Laos not because of the inevitability of the acceptance of 
their ideology but because their concept of the future has not been 
eflectively md cornprchensively challenged. If we have learned 
anything of the cultusd process or the evolution of civilizations it is 
that they change as wholes, not as parts. It is not possible to try to 
hold the religious and social sectors constant and innovate sporadi- 
cally in the economic and military. Herein Iies the basic cause of 
the failure of the West in Laos. The continued use of conventional 
diplomacy and economics will, of necessity, result in future failures 
for the West. Time is on the side of those who broadly conceptunlize 
change. In Laos the Pathet Lao and their backers have pre-emptd 
the field by defanIt. 
